This paper is concerned with a backward-forward stochastic differential equation (BFSDE) system, in which a large number of negligible agents are coupled in their dynamics via state average. Here some BSDE is introduced as the dynamics of major player, while dynamics of minor players are described by SDEs. Some auxiliary mean-field SDEs (MFSDEs) and a 3 × 2 mixed forward-backward stochastic differential equation (FBSDE) system are considered and analyzed instead of involving the fixed-point analysis as in other mean-field games. We also derive the decentralized strategies which are shown to satisfy the ǫ-Nash equilibrium property.
Introduction
In recent years, within the context of noncooperative game theory, the dynamic optimization or control of stochastic large-population (LP) system has attracted consistent and intense attentions in a variety of fields including biology, engineering, operational research, mathematical finance and economics, social science, etc. The most special feature of controlled LP system lies in the existence of considerable insignificant agents whose dynamics and (or) cost functionals are coupled via the state-average across the whole population. To design low-complexity strategies, one efficient methodology is the associated mean-field games which enable us to obtain the decentralized control. Readers may refer [14] for the motivation and methodology, and [5] for recent progress in mean-field game theory. Besides, some other recent literature include [2, 3, 7, [11] [12] [13] 15] for linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) mean-field games of large-population system, [21] for risk sensitive mean-field games. In contrast to previous work, in [10] M. Huang discussed large population systems with major and minor players by analyzing the case in an infinite set where the minor players are from a total of K classes. Later on, Nguyen and Huang [17] considered an LQ problem by directly treating the mean field z in the population limit as a random process with random coefficients. In addition, J. Yong [24] investigated a leader-follower hierarchical game with open-loop information.
In reality, major player (the government, for example) may expect to obtain some recursive utilities who also has a significant role in affecting all minor players. For this kind of model, some backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE) is introduced as the dynamics of major player. Bismut [4] introduced BSDEs as the adjoint equations. Pardoux and Peng first proved the existence and uniqueness of solution for nonlinear BSDEs in [18] , which has been extensively used in stochastic control and mathematical finance. Independently, Duffie and Epstein [8] introduced BSDEs under economic background. Then El Karoui, Peng and Quenez gave the formulation of recursive utilities from the BSDE point of view. As found by [9] , the recursive utility process can be regarded as a solution of BSDE.
Furthermore, with common forward dynamics of minor players, in this paper we derive a backward-forward stochastic differential equation (BFSDE) system, in which a large number of negligible agents are coupled in their dynamics via state average. We discuss the related mean-field LQG games and derive the decentralized strategies which are shown to satisfy the ǫ-Nash equilibrium property. A stochastic process which relates to the state of major player is introduced here to be the approximation of the state-average process. Some auxiliary meanfield stochastic differential equations (MFSDEs) and a 3 × 2 mixed forward-backward stochastic differential equation (FBSDE) system are considered and analyzed.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates the large population LQG games of backward-forward systems. In Section 3, we derive the optimal control of auxiliary track system and the consistency conditions. Section 4 is devoted to the related ǫ-Nash equilibrium. Section 5 concludes our work.
Problem formulation
Throughout this paper, we denote by R m the m-dimensional Euclidean space. Consider a finite time horizon [0, T ] for a fixed T > 0. Suppose (Ω, F, {F t } 0≤t≤T , P ) is a complete filtered probability space on which a standard
Here, {F w 0 t } 0≤t≤T stands for the information of the major player; while {F w i t } 0≤t≤T the individual information of i th minor player. For a given filtration {G t } 0≤t≤T , let L 2 Gt (0, T ; R m ) denote the space of all G t -progressively measurable processes with values in Consider an large population system with (1 + N ) individual agents, denoted by A 0 and {A i } 1≤i≤N , where A 0 stands for the major player, while A i stands for i th minor player. The dynamics of A 0 is given by a BSDE as follows:
where ξ ∈ F w 0 T satisfies E|ξ| 2 < +∞. The state of minor player A i is a SDE satisfying
where
x i (t) is the state-average of minor players; x i0 is the initial value of A i . Here, A 0 , B 0 , C 0 , A, B, D, α, σ are scalar constants. Assume that F t is the augmentation of σ{W 0 (s), W i (s), x i0 ; 0 ≤ s ≤ t, 1 ≤ i ≤ N } by all the P -null sets of F, which is the full information accessible to the large population system up to time t. The admissible control strategy u 0 ∈ U 0 , u i ∈ U i where
The Limiting Optimal Control and NCE Equation System
To study Problem (I), one efficient approach is to discuss the associated mean-field games via limiting problem when the agent number N tends to infinity. For a given stochastic triple
is approximated byx(·) as N → +∞. Introduce the following auxiliary dynamics of major and minor players, still denote by x 0 (·), x i (·) respectively:
and
Hereφ andφ, ϕ = A, B, C are to be determined. The associated limiting cost functionals becomeJ
Remark 3.1 Due to the reason that the state-average of minor players appears only in the cost functional of major player, the first equation in (5) has the same form with (1) actually. However, for regularity, we still write it out.
Thus, we formulate the limiting LQG game (II) as follows.
Problem (II). For i th agent
u i satisfying (9) is called an optimal control for (II).
To get the optimal control of Problem (II), we should obtain the optimal control of A 0 first. For this aim, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1 Corresponding to the forward-backward system (5) and (7), the optimal control of A 0 for (II) is given byū
where the adjoint process p 0 (·) and the corresponding optimal trajectory (x 0 (·),ẑ 0 (·)) satisfy the following Hamilton system
Proof. For the variation of control
Applying Itô's formula to p 0 (t)δx 0 (t) + p(t)δx(t) + q(t)δk(t) and noting the associated first order variation of cost functional :
we obtain the optimal control (10) . Combining all state and adjoint equations, and applyinḡ u 0 (·) to A 0 , we get the Hamilton system (11). After obtaining the optimal control of major player A 0 , we aim to get the optimal control of minor player A i corresponding tox 0 (·) respectively.
Lemma 3.2 Under (H1), the optimal control of
where the adjoint process p i (·) and the corresponding optimal trajectoryx i (·) satisfy the BSDE dp
and SDE
Here
are given by (11) . For the coupled BFSDE (14) and (15), we are going to decouple it and trying to derive the Nash certainty equivalence (NCE) system satisfied by the decentralized control policy. Then we have 
we obtain a revisionary Hamilton system:
which is a triple FBSDE (TFBSDE for short).
Proof.
Applying Itô's formula to P i (t)x i (t) + f i (t), we have dp
Comparing the coefficients with (14), we get β i (t) = σP i (t),
Noting that Riccati equation (18) is symmetric, it is known that (18) admits a unique nonnegative bounded solution P i (·) (see [ma,yong] ). Further we get that P 1 (·) = P 2 (·) = · · · = P N (·) := P (·). Then (18) coincides with (16) . Besides, if the linear BSDE (19) admits a unique solution
Thus, the decentralized feedback strategy for A i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N is written as
where x i (·) and the associated x 0 (·) are given by (2) and (1) respectively. Plugging (20) into (2) implies the centralized closed-loop state:
Taking summation, dividing by N and letting N → +∞, we get
Comparing the coefficients with (5), we havē
Then we obtain
From (5), it follows that
Then (17) is obtained, which completes the proof. About the wellposedness of (17), we have the following result. 
) which can be obtained outline. Thus it is equivalent with the fixed point principle. To our best knowledge, it is the first time to focus on the wellposedness of TFBSDE in large population problems. It is of great feature and meaningful.
ǫ-Nash Equilibrium Analysis
In above sections, we obtained the optimal controlū i (·), 0 ≤ i ≤ N of Problem (II) through the consistency condition system. Now we turn to verify the ǫ-Nash equilibrium of Problem (I). To start, we first present the definition of ǫ-Nash equilibrium. 
when any alternative control u ′ i ∈ U i is applied by A i . If ǫ = 0, then Definition 4.1 is reduced to the usual Nash equilibrium. Now, we state the main result of this paper and its proof will be given later.
Theorem 4.1 Under (H1), (ũ 0 ,ũ 1 ,ũ 2 , · · · ,ũ N ) satisfies the ǫ-Nash equilibrium of (I). Here, u 0 is given byũ
where p 0 (·) is obtained outline by (17) ; while for 1 ≤ i ≤ N,ũ i is
wherex i (·), the decentralized state trajectory for A i , satisfies (21) .
The proof of above theorem needs several lemmas which are presented later. Denote by (x 0 (·),z 0 (·)) the centralized state trajectory; (x 0 (·),ẑ 0 (·)) the decentralized one. Applyingũ 0 (·) to A 0 and using the notations given above, it is easy to get that (
The cost functional in centralized case and decentralized one are given by
andJ
respectively. For A i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N , we have the following close-loop system
with the cost functional
The auxiliary system (of limiting problem) is given by
where (x(t)x 0 , k(t)x 0 ) satisfies (17) . We have
Proof. By (28), we have
Noting that
by (17) and Gronwall's inequality, we get (32). It is easily got that sup
In addition, by (10) and (24), we haveũ 0 (·) =û 0 (·). Thus (33) is obtained. For minor players, we have the following estimates: 
0≤t≤T E x i (t) 2 < +∞, we obtain (37).
Until now, we have addressed some estimates of states and costs corresponding to controlũ i andū i ,0 ≤ i ≤ N . Next we will focus on the ǫ-Nash equilibrium for (I). Consider a perturbed control u 0 ∈ U 0 for A 0 and introduce some notations as
whereas minor players keep the controlũ i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N, i.e.,
And for any fixed i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , consider a perturbed control u i ∈ U i for A i , whereas major and other minor players keep the controlũ j , 0 ≤ j ≤ N, j = i. Introduce
Ifũ j , 0 ≤ j ≤ N is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium with respect to cost J j , it holds that
Then, when making the perturbation, we just need to consider u j ∈ U j such that J j (u j ,ũ −j ) ≤ J j (ũ j ,ũ −j ), which implies
In the limiting cost functionalJ j , by the optimality of (x j ,ū j ), we get that (
Then we obtain the boundedness ofJ j (ū j ), i.e.,
where C is a positive constant and independent of N . Then we have the following proposition.
Proof. By (43), using the usual technique of BSDE, we get the boundedness of sup
It follows from (39) that
By (41) and (42), it holds that
Here, C 1 , C 2 are both positive constants. Since sup 0≤t≤T E l 0 (t) 2 is bounded, we get the boundedness of sup 0≤t≤T E k(t) l 0 2 by (40). It follows from (43) that E|u i (t)| 2 is bounded. Besides, the optimal controlsũ k (t), k = i is L 2 -bounded. Then by Gronwall's inequality, it follows that
Hence for any 1
Correspondingly, the system for agent A 0 under control u 0 in (II) is as follows
(46)
Then we have
Proof. From (38) and (44), by the existence and uniqueness of BSDE, we have (l ′ 0 , q ′ 0 ) = (l 0 , q 0 ). Further, noting FBSDE (40) and (46), we get (
0 . Noting (46) and
and applying Gronwall's inequality, we get (47). Using the same technique as Lemma 4.1 and noting sup
2 < +∞, we obtain (48).
Now, we will focus on the difference for the perturbed control and optimal control of minor players. Given the system for agent
and for agent A j , j = i,
where (x(t)x 0 , k(t)x 0 ) satisfying (17) because ofx 0 =x 0 . In order to give necessary estimates in (I) and (II), we also introduce some intermediate states as
and for j = i,
(52) (42) and (52), we get
We have the following estimates on these states. While from (37) and (60), we get
Thus, Theorem 4.1 follows by taking ǫ = O 1 √ N .
Conclusion
In this paper, the dynamics of major player is given by some BSDE, while dynamics of minor players are described by SDEs. The BFSDE system is established in which a large number of negligible agents are coupled in their dynamics via state average. Some auxiliary mean-field SDEs (MFSDEs) and a 3 × 2 mixed FBSDE system are considered and analyzed instead of involving the fixed-point analysis as in other mean-field games. The decentralized strategies are derived, which are also shown to satisfy the ǫ-Nash equilibrium property. In the future, one possible direction is that state-average appears in dynamics of major player, which may bring lots of trouble in proving the ǫ-Nash equilibrium. Another direction is that dynamics of minor players are backward and the consistent condition analysis may be more complicated. Numerical computation and other applications in finance will also be investigated in the future work.
